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█ Abstract The paper discusses the contribution that the neuroscience of action can offer to the legal un-
derstanding of action control and responsibility in the case of adult individuals. In particular, we address 
the issues that follow. What are the cognitive capacities that agents must display in order to be held liable 
to punishment in criminal law? Is the legal model of liability to punishment compatible with a scientifical-
ly informed understanding of voluntary behaviour? To what extent should the law take into account peo-
ple’s subjective feelings about their own actions? As a result of our analyses, we indicate some areas where 
the contribution of the neuroscience of action to the law is potentially relevant. We focus on the subjec-
tivity mechanisms of action control, specifically the requirement that the agent must violate the law vol-
untarily in order to be held responsible, and on the factors that modulate the wrongdoer’s experience of 
agency. Overall, we advocate more cross-disciplinary work, aimed to bridge the gap between conceptual 
boundaries, on the theme of responsibility for actions. 
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█ Riassunto La responsabilità tra neuroscienza e diritto penale. La componente di controllo dell’imputabilità 
penale – L’articolo discute il contributo che la neuroscienza dell’azione può offrire ai temi del controllo 
dell’azione e della responsabilità in ambito legale, nel caso degli individui adulti. In particolare, ci occupe-
remo delle questioni che seguono. Quali sono le abilità cognitive che un agente deve possedere per esser 
considerato penalmente responsabile e quindi punibile? Il modello legalistico della responsabilità è com-
patibile con il modello scientifico-naturalistico del comportamento umano? Fino a che punto variazioni 
nel senso di controllo soggettivo sulle azioni dovrebbero essere considerate un parametro rilevante in sede 
penale? Sulla scorta della nostra analisi, indicheremo alcune aree nelle quali il contributo della neuroscien-
za dell’azione a questioni legate al tema della responsabilità legale potrebbe rivelarsi rilevante. L’articolo si 
concentra sui meccanismi che regolano il senso soggettivo di controllo dell’azione – in particolare il requi-
sito secondo il quale l’agente deve violare la legge volontariamente per essere ritenuto responsabile –, e sui 
fattori che modulano il senso di agentività del colpevole. In conclusione, difenderemo l’appropriatezza di 
una più ampia riflessione multi-disciplinare volta a ridurre le incompatibilità fra differenti approcci al te-
ma della responsabilità per le nostre azioni.  
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INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR ACTIONS IS a 
central component in individual self-
assessment and interpersonal relations. It is al-
so a key notion in the law, representing a pre-
condition for liability to punishment in crim-
inal law. However, its psychological prereq-
uisites remain partially underexplored. The 
goal of the present paper is twofold. First, it 
aims to elucidate the minimal psychological 
abilities that an adult individual must display 
in order to be considered liable to punish-
ment. Second, it investigates the plausibility 
of such criteria with respect to an empirically 
informed picture of voluntary agency. 
Based on our analyses, we provide some 
suggestions about possible contributions that 
neuroscience can offer to the law. Whereas 
the scope of our paper is mostly theoretical, to 
support our view we will use some examples 
drawn from English criminal law.  
In order to effectively target individual 
behaviour and promote social cohesion, the 
law must incorporate – implicitly at least – a 
model of intentional, goal-oriented agency, 
whose nature has increasingly become an ob-
ject of interest for psychology and neurosci-
ence. Looking for a unified model of human 
psychology, which is both empirically tracta-
ble and suitable for the law, is therefore cru-
cial. However, it is a common view among 
neuroscientists and legal scholars that neuro-
science and the law must remain two sepa-
rate enterprises.1 A separation in scope and 
methodology between the two disciplines is 
indeed worth preserving. While science has a 
descriptive duty and is concerned with “what 
there is”, the law has an essentially normative 
goal and deals with what “ought to be”. In 
this light, Stephen Morse has plausibly sug-
gested that neuroscience can describe what 
conditions “count” as impairments to human 
cognition and reasoning, but does not have 
the power to tell the law what impairments to 
human’s cognition and reasoning “should 
count” as excuses from punishment.2 
In the emerging field of “neurolaw”,3 at 
least two different approaches have emerged. 
From a theoretical, forward-looking point of 
view, the discussion has focussed on the po-
tential transformative role of neuroscience 
and cognitive psychology. These disciplines 
are seen as potentially revolutionising our 
understanding of the bases of voluntary 
agency, directly affecting the legal notions of 
“criminal culpability” and “liability to pun-
ishment”. For example, Green and Cohen 
have suggested that neuroscience will trans-
form the law by highlighting that the inflated 
libertarian conception of metaphysical free 
will, which seemingly inhabits the law, is not 
compatible with a scientifically informed pic-
ture of human agency.4  
By contrast, Morse has claimed that the 
law incorporates a concept of personhood 
that has nothing to do with metaphysical free 
will and is fundamental to our understanding 
of people as humans, i.e., humans are practi-
cal deliberators who are able to act inten-
tionally. This view is so strongly ingrained in 
human normative practices that cannot be 
easily put in jeopardy by neuroscientific ad-
vances. According to Morse, unless the neu-
roscience of decision-making is able to 
demonstrate that no one can resist one’s im-
pulses and cravings, it would be implausible 
to assume it can really transform our legal 
concept of responsibility.5 
From an empirical point of view, the core 
question is what contribution psychological 
and brain sciences can currently offer in 
court. Neuroscientific evidence could be used 
to inform decisions about the degree to 
which an individual agent is responsible for a 
specific action. In several cases, the law is al-
ready sufficiently sensitive to the advances in 
the scientific study of the mind and the brain. 
In particular, the contribution of neurosci-
ence and psychology in specific cases of devi-
ation from the standard is already accepted 
in some jurisdictions.6 In individual cases, the 
presence of specific psychopathologies may 
be invoked in order to exempt some people 
from criminal liability or reduce individual 
responsibility. For example, clarifying wheth-
er the defendant’s action (when the person 
kills or is a party to the killing of another) is 
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attributable to a recognised medical condition 
may allow the defendant to plead a defence of 
diminished responsibility.7 In this respect, the 
main point at stake concerns the admissibil-
ity of neuroscientific techniques for estab-
lishing a causal connection, and not just a 
correlation, between a physical brain state 
and a specific outcome, explaining how given 
mental states are traceable to brain abnor-
malities.8 
In the present work, we adopt a meta-
approach in order to address the following 
issues. What are the cognitive capacities that 
healthy agents must display in order to be 
held liable to punishment in criminal law? Is 
the legal model of liability to punishment 
compatible with a scientifically informed un-
derstanding of voluntary behaviour? To what 
extent should the law take into account peo-
ple’s subjective feelings about their own ac-
tions? Clearly, neuroscience is unlikely to 
provide evidence that no one can ever resist 
one’s impulses and cravings or fulfil the crite-
ria for minimal rationality. Actually, it re-
mains unclear why the contribution of neu-
roscience to the law should go in this direc-
tion at all, i.e., by showing that individuals 
entirely and always lack self-control. By con-
trast, we already know from neuroscience 
that self-control, as the capacity to inhibit ac-
tions,9 is precisely one of the key features of 
human cognition,10 which can be impaired in 
case of damages to the frontal lobe.11 Fur-
thermore, neuroscience can explain the 
mechanisms underlying purposive behaviour, 
i.e., in terms of the ability to act in view of a 
goal and on the basis of rewards and pun-
ishments,12 rather than showing that people 
are unable to act on the basis of reasons.  
Morse acknowledges that neuroscience 
may rather play a role in adjudicating cases of 
excuses and mitigation, by further under-
standing of the conditions that prevent peo-
ple from exercising rationality and self-
control. However, he seemingly dismisses 
this point as ultimately not so relevant for the 
law. We take a different perspective, by em-
phasising the importance of this challenge. 
Despite sharing Morse’s doubts about the 
overall transformative role of neuroscience 
for the law, we suggest that neuroscience can 
both play a role in refining the criteria for 
minimal rationality and action control and 
specify what good candidates for excuses and 
mitigation should look like. In arguing for 
this, we mainly focus on the element of ac-
tion control (among other cognitive abilities 
that the defendant must display to be liable 
to punishment), which is central to the neu-
roscience of volition and action.  
Should discrepancies between neurosci-
ence and the law be individuated, this should 
trigger a proper discussion about how to in-
tegrate the two approaches. Examples in this 
direction are already offered by discussion in 
cognate research fields. For example, the em-
pirical study of memory has uncovered prob-
lematic phenomena, including false and im-
agined memories or reconsolidation, thus 
showing that people’s memory (e.g., of a wit-
ness in a crime) is not as reliable as it was 
thought to be in the past. Recognising that 
the human capacity to remember past events 
is partially undermined by cognitive biases 
has appropriately triggered a discussion on 
the usage of memory in the courtroom.13  
The paper is organised as follows. First, we 
discuss how moral responsibility relates to 
criminal liability for action in order to single 
out the notion of “responsibility” that is rele-
vant in the courtroom. Second, we introduce 
the theme of what counts as an excuse. The 
topic of excuses represents a useful conceptual 
tool for shedding light on the psychological 
prerequisites for criminal responsibility. Build-
ing on this, we distinguish between a control-
component and a cognitive-component of re-
sponsibility for actions, in order to assess 
whether these criteria could match reliable evi-
dence in psychology and neuroscience about 
how voluntary agency unfolds. In discussing 
the contribution that the neuroscience of voli-
tion and action can offer to the law, we focus 
on the subjective feeling of agency naturally 
accompanying the performance of voluntary 
bodily movements. Some final remarks are 
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outlined in the last section. Whereas the theo-
retical scope of the paper is not limited to a sin-
gle jurisdiction, we mostly focus on examples 
taken from the English criminal law. 
 
█  Moral responsibility and criminal liability 
 
This section of the paper discusses the no-
tion of “responsibility” that is central to crim-
inal liability for law violation. In modern de-
mocracies, criminal sanctions are usually 
thought to derive from the violation of some 
shared code whose respect is imposed by the 
law. Such a code seemingly derives from the 
combination of moral or conventional “oughts” 
and biological needs. 
The kind of responsibility that is targeted 
by criminal sanctions is essentially “retrospec-
tive personal responsibility for a wrongful ac-
tion” (e.g., “Oswald is responsible for killing 
Kennedy”), as distinct from prospective re-
sponsibility, which may come in the form of 
general obligations (e.g., “Ted is responsible 
for his child’s health and education”) or spe-
cific duties (e.g., “Melanie is responsible for 
feeding the lovebirds within the next few 
days”). The emphasis on retrospection means 
that the action in question, i.e., the violation 
of the code, has already occurred, namely 
that the physical facts regarding individual 
agency are not in doubt. 
In evaluating the agent’s responsibility, 
criminal law takes into account the connec-
tion existing between the agent’s wrongful 
purpose and the actual harm. Once the 
agent’s involvement in a wrongful action is 
acknowledged, different degrees of connec-
tion between the agent’s intent and the out-
come (i.e., different kinds of “mens rea”) de-
termine alternative classes of crimes. This 
view of the connection between the agent’s 
mental state and the action largely relies on 
classic belief-desire psychology: conscious 
mental states, i.e., intentions, cause the corre-
sponding outcomes.14 In the absence of ex-
empting or justifying conditions, the agent is to 
be held as fully responsible for her own behav-
iour because she acted as she intended to act.15  
“Mens rea” is a legal term, with a moral 
flavour. It has been suggested that criminal 
liability supervenes on moral responsibility,16 
without the two concepts necessarily coincid-
ing. For an act to be criminally culpable, it 
must also be explicitly made criminal by the 
statute or common law: despite being moral-
ly despicable, many actions (e.g., breaking an 
informal promise) are not illegal. Further-
more, the pre-conditions for moral responsi-
bility and legal accountability may differ. 
Philosophers working on moral responsibil-
ity often suggest that moral responsibility 
depends on the agent displaying some sort of 
free will, which might be compatible or not 
with metaphysical determinism.17  
We suggest that the problem of free will is 
potentially more relevant when it comes to de-
fining the role and the justification of pun-
ishment, i.e., whether these concepts must be 
framed in retributivist or consequentialist 
terms, which is the actual main target of 
Greene and Cohen’s 2004 paper. In this re-
spect, the question about free will, i.e., of 
whether people are biologically determined 
or not in making their choices and act upon 
them, is seemingly more important. No single 
justification of punishment is offered in 
criminal law, which is usually a mixture of 
retributivist (i.e., the wrongdoer deserves to 
be punished for violating the law) and conse-
quentialist (i.e., punishment sub-serves utili-
tarian scopes) intuitions. According to 
Greene and Cohen, neurobiological deter-
minism is incompatible with a retributivist 
view of punishment, which must therefore be 
abandoned in favour of a consequentialist or 
forward-looking (prospective) view.18  
In our view, the issue about the role and 
justification of punishment must be kept 
conceptually separate from the question 
about the pre-conditions for responsibility. 
Thus, since the law tends not to see the ques-
tion of free will as a pre-condition for legal 
responsibility, in this context we also consid-
er this issue of free will as orthogonal to our 
discourse. By contrast, we suggest that re-
sponsibility is a social concept that depends 
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upon intersubjectively shared norms of co-
operation: the concept would lose any grip if 
the agent were not part of a social communi-
ty, or if she did not have the capacity to men-
talise (i.e., to understand other people’s states 
of mind) and to see others as intentional 
agents (i.e., as capable of acting upon their 
mental states). Its pre-conditions, including 
self-control and self-awareness, are psycho-
logical rather than metaphysical.19 
 
█  Justifications and excuses 
 
What elements contribute to justify or ex-
empt from punishment someone who com-
mits a wrongdoing? Personal responsibility is 
usually assumed to be a primitive or default 
condition by the law. In the absence of ex-
empting or mitigating factors, a wrongdoer is 
treated as fully responsible for her own be-
haviour. Personal responsibility for action is 
justified by drawing on some version of the 
idea that each individual, at least in principle, 
is to be regarded as able to behave autono-
mously and control her own actions.20 This is 
generally invoked as a principle of fairness 
regulating interpersonal relationships. Treat-
ing the wrongdoer as someone who is unable 
to control her behaviour might seem to be 
detrimental to her individual autonomy and 
“dignity”. 
In a seminal paper, Hart treats responsi-
bility in terms of “defeasibility”: a person is 
responsible for something unless such re-
sponsibility attribution can be defeated by 
the presence of a justification or an excuse.21 
The distinction between justifications and 
excuses is a mainstay in the philosophy of 
criminal law and in the classification of de-
fences established by the English common 
law.22 Justifications work as follows: when 
an offence actually takes place, the defend-
ant can be exculpated by proving that her 
conduct was not legally wrong due to the 
particular circumstances in which the action 
was performed. By contrast, when excuses 
can be invoked, the action remains legally 
wrong, but the defendant is not to be pun-
ished – or, at least, the punishment should 
be mitigated. The distinction has undergone 
a number of criticisms.23 However, admit-
ting the possibility of justifications and ex-
cuses allows the defendant to be treated ac-
cording to the specific circumstances of the 
action and the agent’s peculiar cognitive 
abilities and mental states.24  
With justifications (e.g., cases of self-
defence), responsibility is preserved. With 
excuses, it is nullified or diminished. For this 
reason, excuses are particularly relevant for 
the analysis of the psychological pre-
conditions of responsibility in criminal law. 
Excuses are effective if they can appropriate-
ly question the presence of at least one of the 
necessary elements for criminal liability, i.e., 
“actus reus” and “mens rea”. But what counts 
as an excuse? When the agent performs a 
wrongful action, she could be (partially) ex-
empted from criminal liability if the presence 
of given psychological conditions is acknowl-
edged.  
In “case” law, no unified and complete list 
of excusing psychological conditions is avail-
able. Potentially, individual cases could al-
ways establish new precedents. Moreover, 
since the success of a plea is subjected to the 
judge’s or jury’s verdict, the possible presence 
of an excuse is to be considered as a sufficient 
condition for acquittal, but not as an element 
that will necessarily lead to a discharge. In 
English common law, the need to guarantee 
that people displaying given psychological 
conditions can appeal to excuses of some sort 
is regulated by the automatism/insanity de-
fence (full defence), and the diminished re-
sponsibility and loss of control defence (par-
tial defence).25  
Methodologically speaking, considering 
cases of full and partial defences (i.e., what is 
missing for full-fledged responsibility) may 
offer some insights on the pre-conditions for 
responsibility in regular cases. The focus is 
not on pleas “per se”: we will consider them 
as valuable tools for shedding light on the el-
ements characterising cases of responsibility 
for actions. 
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█  Insanity and automatism 
 
In English common law, insanity and au-
tomatism are two different kinds of (mutually 
incompatible) defences that may nullify crim-
inal responsibility for a crime. Exempting 
completely from criminal liability, insanity 
and automatism are both considered forms of 
full defence. 
 
█  Insanity 
 
The verdict of «not guilty by reason of 
insanity» is a full defence to a crime that 
may apply to three different situations, i.e., 
insanity before the trial, unfitness to plead, 
and insanity at the time of the offence.26  
Given that the focus is on the psychologi-
cal elements of responsibility for actions, in-
sanity at the time of the offence appears par-
ticularly relevant. In the English common 
law, it is regulated by the application of the 
M’Naghten rules (1843), which aimed to set 
up a test for establishing a specific defect of 
reason that makes the defendant not guilty 
by reason of insanity. As stated by the House 
of Lords in 1843: «To establish a defence on 
the ground of insanity, it must be clearly 
proved that, at the time of the committing of 
the act, the party accused was labouring un-
der such a defect of reason, from disease of 
the mind, as not to know the nature and 
quality of the act he was doing; or, if he did 
know it, that he did not know he was doing 
what was wrong».27  
Recently the Law Commission has pro-
posed to replace the defence of insanity with 
the lack of capacity defence, leading to a ver-
dict of «not criminally responsible by reason 
of a recognised medical condition», which 
must be professionally recognised.28 
The grounding idea of the proposal is that 
the defendant can be recognised «not crimi-
nally responsible by reason of a recognised 
medical condition» if, at the time of the of-
fence, she could not have done otherwise. In 
this context, the impossibility of doing oth-
erwise is verified if the defendant lacks one 
or several of the cognitive capacities that fol-
low: (1) the capacity to rationally form a 
judgment about the relevant conduct or cir-
cumstances; (2) the capacity to understand 
the wrongfulness of what she is charged with 
having done; (3) the capacity to control her 
physical acts in relation to the relevant con-
duct or circumstances. The recent introduc-
tion of a reference to a medical condition 
goes in the direction of assessing insanity on 
a potentially more objective ground, which 
might subtract weight and explanatory power 
from individual subjective reports. The aim 
is to move towards a more empirically driven 
understanding of the conditions for insanity 
whereby the focus remains nonetheless on 
the cognitive aspect of the incapacitation.  
To be unable to do otherwise in this 
sense, the defendant must suffer from a con-
dition of permanent or temporary cognitive 
impairment, which is thought to make her 
unable to distinguish right from wrong, or to 
understand the nature and quality of her own 
actions. The cognitive faculties that are usu-
ally associated with these capacities are those 
of reason, memory and understanding.29 The 
term “insanity” per se is a (stigmatising and 
out-dated) legal and not a medical, term: in-
sanity defines cognitive deficiency rather 
than irrationality.30 To count for the insanity 
defence, a “defect of reason” must be caused 
by an internal source, identifiable as a disease 
of the mind (including arteriosclerosis,31 epi-
lepsy,32 sleepwalking,33 hyperglycaemia aris-
ing from diabetes34).  
The vagueness of the criteria for cognitive 
insanity and the thin distinction between in-
ternal and external causes of the disease have 
been extensively criticised in the literature.35 
In particular, the definition of “insanity” 
could prove to be too narrow to capture bor-
derline cases, including cases in which people 
happily did the wrong thing knowing that it 
was wrong. The interpretation of the concept 
of “wrong” itself eludes straightforward ex-
planations. On the one hand, the emphasis 
on rationality as a capacity is meant to avoid 
confusions between cognitive impairment 
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(i.e., being unable to understand that some-
thing is legally wrong) and ignorance of the 
contents of the law (e.g., not knowing that 
doing something is prohibited by the law).  
The latter does not amount to an acquit-
tal (ignorantia juris non excusat): if the de-
fendant is ignorant about the content of a 
norm but not cognitively impaired, she is lia-
ble to punishment. It is worth noting that a 
relevant cognitive impairment is also differ-
ent from ignorance of what one is doing, 
which may potentially exculpate from liabil-
ity. For example, if the defendant did not 
know that the drink she was serving to the 
victim was poisonous, she is likely to be ex-
culpated from liability.36  
On the other hand, the M’Naghten rules 
specify that the defendant can plead the de-
fence of insanity if she did not understand that 
what she was doing was wrong. However, if ig-
norance of the specific content of the law is not 
relevant for pleading the defence of insanity, it 
seems that what the test is actually establishing 
is whether the defendant was unable to under-
stand what was morally, and not just legally, 
wrong – as some of the relevant cases explicitly 
state.37 If this were the case, the requirements 
for criminal liability could map more precisely 
onto typical conditions for responsibility in 
moral psychology, including responsiveness to 
reasons or the ability to distinguish right from 
wrong.38 
The law seemingly assumes that, beyond 
the knowledge of specific norms, individuals 
have reached a certain level of moral under-
standing. In this sense, the defendant must 
be at least able to procedurally follow the 
norms that are prescribed by the law. This 
means that she should be able to understand 
what the law requires and to modify her be-
haviour accordingly. To do this, the defend-
ant must possess some basic requirements of 
rationality allowing her to convert general 
rules into everyday practices. 
 
█  Automatism 
 
Non-insane automatism is a different form 
of complete defence, which could be pleaded 
in cases where the action is produced by an 
external source or a reflex action, including 
sneezing, hypoglycaemia, and post-traumatic 
stress disorder.39  
A successful plea of automatism requires 
that the defendant, at the time of the offence, 
lacked control over her body (“lack of con-
sciousness” or “volitional control”). The pur-
pose of this type of defence is to deny that 
the unlawful action was performed under the 
defendant’s voluntary control so that even 
strict liability is absent. Pleas of automatism 
are limited to specific situations, which do 
not include cases of prior fault, intoxication, 
duress, and insanity.40 
The idea is that, in cases of automatism, 
what is absent is the mind’s control over the 
physical body.41  
 
█  Diminished responsibility 
 
Reforming section 2 of the Homicide Act 
1957 (c. 11), Section 52 of the Coroners and 
Justice Act 2009 (England and Wales) states 
that, when supported by medical evidence,42 
an abnormality in the defendant’s mental 
functioning could be the basis of a plea of 
diminished responsibility.43 The grounding 
idea is that an abnormality of mental func-
tioning causes (or is a significant contributo-
ry factor in causing) the wrongdoing, for ex-
ample by impairing the defendant’s «ability 
to form a rational judgment and to exercise 
self-control at the relevant time».44 
Differently from the defences of insanity 
and automatism, the plea of diminished re-
sponsibility is a partial defence, which applies 
only to murder. The importance of the de-
fence is that, when successfully pleaded, the 
trial judge will have discretion in the sen-
tence to be imposed. The practical result 
would be that the offence can be classified as 
manslaughter rather than as murder. Analo-
gously to automatism, the defence does not 
apply in cases of voluntary acute intoxica-
tion.45 According to the diminished responsi-
bility defence: 
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(1)  A person (“D”) who kills or is a party to 
the killing of another is not to be con-
victed of murder if D was suffering from 
an abnormality of mental functioning 
which – (a) arose from a recognised 
medical condition; (b) substantially im-
paired D’s ability to do one or more of 
the things mentioned in subsection 
(1A); and (c) provides an explanation 
for D’s acts and omissions in doing or 
being a party to the killing. 
(1A)  Those things are – (a) to understand the 
nature of D’s conduct; (b) to form a ra-
tional judgment; (c) to exercise self-
control. 
(1B)  For the purposes of subsection (1)(c), an 
abnormality of mental functioning pro-
vides an explanation for D’s conduct if it 
causes, or is a significant contributory 
factor in causing, D to carry out that 
conduct.46  
 
█  Loss of control 
 
Sections 54-55 of the Coroners and Justice 
Act 2009 (England and Wales) introduced an 
entirely new loss of control defence, which re-
placed the former provocation defence. 
 
 (1) Where a person (“D”) kills or is a party 
to the killing of another (“V”), D is not 
to be convicted of murder if – (a) D’s 
acts and omissions in doing or being a 
party to the killing resulted from D’s 
loss of self-control; (b) the loss of self-
control had a qualifying trigger;47 and 
(c) a person of D’s sex and age, with a 
normal degree of tolerance and self-
restraint and in the circumstances of 
D, might have reacted in the same or 
in a similar way to D. 
 
Differently from what stated in the Hom-
icide Act about provocation,48 in the case of 
the loss of control defence it is not required 
that control is suddenly lost. At the same 
time the killing cannot be the result of the 
defendant’s desire for revenge. Where the de-
fence applies, the defendant is liable to be 
convicted of voluntary manslaughter, instead 
of murder. 
 
█  Responsibility between criminal law and 
psychology 
   
In the previous section, we listed the cas-
es in which criminal liability is absent or 
mitigated due to different types of cognitive 
impairments recognised by the law. Based 
on this, the scope of the present section is to 
discuss a positive characterisation of the 
pre-conditions for criminal liability. Analys-
ing the defences outlined in the previous 
section, criminal liability emerges as de-
pending upon action control and the joint 
presence of some cognitive/epistemic abili-
ties. Action control refers to the agent’s capac-
ity to regulate her own physical movements, 
acting in accordance to her own goals or re-
fraining from acting when needed. From the 
cognitive/epistemic point of view, an agent 
acting according to her own goals must also 
be able to understand the nature of the con-
sequences of her actions. These two compo-
nents are deeply intertwined to the extent 
that, to be criminally liable, the individual 
must be able to prevent herself (control-
component) from acting in ways that would 
be understandably (cognitive-component) 
against the law: the defendant must be able 
to violate the law voluntarily. 
Taken together, these elements fulfil the 
requisites of Hart’s definition of “capacity-
responsibility”, according to which responsi-
bility for actions is defined by: «Understand-
ing, reasoning, and control of conduct: the 
ability to understand what conduct legal 
rules on morality require, to deliberate and 
reach decisions concerning these require-
ments, and to conform to decisions when 
made».49 An agent who is responsible in this 
sense satisfies also Shoemaker’s requirements 
for responsibility as answerability: «To be 
answerability-responsible for F is for F to be 
connected to my evaluative judgments in a 
way that renders me able (in principle) to cite 
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the reasons I took to justify F».50 
In the remaining part of this section, we 
focus on the concepts of “action control” and 
“voluntariness” in the law and cognitive sci-
ence. As will become evident, the distinction 
between voluntary and involuntary actions in 
criminal law does not perfectly map onto the 
distinction between voluntary and involun-
tary actions in psychology and cognitive neu-
roscience. 
 
█  Control and voluntariness in the law 
 
Voluntariness is a key element both in the 
full (i.e., insanity, automatism) and in the 
partial (i.e., diminished responsibility, loss of 
control) defences previously outlined. For 
the defendant to be liable to punishment 
«the accused’s “conduct” […] must, so it is 
said, be voluntary and not involuntary»:51 no 
criminal offence could be committed without 
the execution of a voluntary act.52 The dis-
tinction between voluntary and involuntary 
actions represents the basic psychological 
category for evaluating one’s criminal re-
sponsibility for an offence. Absence of volun-
tariness might be produced both by external 
and internal factors, and corresponds to the 
agent lacking physical or mental control over 
the action. Conceptually prior to evaluating 
the presence and degree of “mens rea”, the 
acknowledgment of an action as voluntary 
enables the assessment of one’s “strict” or 
“absolute liability” (i.e., independent of fault, 
negligence, or intention) to punishment for 
criminal offences. Thus, the concept of “vol-
untary” is used to discriminate between ac-
tions and mere movements, suggesting the 
presence of a «minimum link between mind 
and body, indispensable for any form of 
criminal responsibility».53 In traditional ju-
risprudence, a voluntary action is defined as 
a muscular contraction (physical element) 
preceded by an act of the will or a volition 
(mental element).54 Sticking to ordinary lan-
guage, Hart reconstructs this very general pic-
ture by saying that involuntary movements 
(namely «not governed by the will») are 
those movements that are not subordinate to 
the agent’s conscious plans of action: control-
ling agency – in the absence of which no one 
should be held criminally responsible – is «the 
mind of a man bent on some conscious ac-
tion».55 As a result, this requirement that the 
action was voluntarily executed might seem 
suspiciously dualistic in its content.  
Despite widespread agreement concern-
ing the basic aim of the principle, the correct 
interpretation of the requirement is conten-
tious. Many legal theorists highlight that, far 
from having a positive content, the term 
“voluntary” is no more than an excluder 
word, i.e., an abstract expression describing 
the absence of alternative states, such as co-
ercion, sleep, or unconsciousness.56 Crucially, 
such a requirement prevents people from be-
ing prosecuted for something they did not 
do: the defendant must be judged only for an 
action she has performed. In the absence of 
an action, there would be no sufficient evi-
dence of the actor’s intention to do some-
thing wrong57 – this explains the difficulty in 
addressing cases of attempts, omissions and 
vicarious liability.58 
In order to include omissions, some legal 
theorists define the legally relevant connection 
between the agent and the outcome in terms of 
what the agent had the power to do or control, 
even in the absence of causation. It is worth 
noting that causation per se is not sufficient 
from criminal liability or for assessing “mens 
rea”.59 In fact, the outcome may depend on 
oblique intention, negligent or reckless behav-
iour, and “bad luck” rather than on direct in-
tent. In other cases, the agent might cause the 
outcome in an accidental way.60  
Therefore, save cases of strict liability, 
causation is not sufficient for establishing the 
agent’s level of criminal responsibility. The 
voluntary-act requirement fulfils a second 
task, emphasising that, to be punishable, the 
wrongful action must be voluntarily per-
formed. The linkage between the agent’s men-
tal states and the action is usually interpreted 
in causal terms: the wrongdoing would not 
have existed without the defendant’s decision 
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to act or to avoid acting. The law cannot 
prosecute unintentional reflexes resulting 
from automatism. Acting voluntarily implies 
goal-directedness, or at least that the wrong-
ful outcome is the unintended outcome of a 
previous (intended) fault or of a habitual 
movement.61 The set of actions that are con-
sidered voluntary in the criminal law is thus 
more inclusive than the set of intentional ac-
tions in philosophy whereby, according to 
mainstream causal theories, the intention (i.e., 
a consciously accessible mental state) causes 
the action.62 For example, causing harm by 
acting absent-mindedly may attenuate the de-
gree of “mens rea”, without the corresponding 
action being classified as involuntary.  
Overall, the principle suggests that the de-
fendant can be held responsible only for 
things that depend on factors under her con-
trol. An intuitive corollary is that criminal 
liability is unjust if imposed for a state of af-
fairs over which the defendant lacks signifi-
cant control. Criminal law requires that the 
agent is able to control the actual outcome of 
her action, but also that she is able to foresee 
potential or expected outcomes that may de-
rive from the action. For criminal liability to 
apply, the wrongful result must be a predict-
able, avoidable, consequence of a given be-
haviour. To give an example, the actual pres-
ence of a pedestrian is a factual element that 
is beyond the reckless driver’s control, but it 
is a possibility that a rational agent is sup-
posed to be able to take into account. 
 
██ Control and voluntariness in cognitive sci-
ence 
 
The law admits differences in degrees for 
given psychological categories (including 
“mens rea” or diminished responsibility), but 
draws a thick line between voluntary and in-
voluntary actions. In the case of the defences 
outlined in the previous section, the involun-
tary character of the act traces back to differ-
ent types of cognitive impairments. In the 
absence of a condition of cognitive impair-
ment, the law assumes that the act was will-
ingly executed, without referring to any spe-
cific brain function and relying on classic de-
sire-belief psychology. Defending such a 
strong dichotomy between voluntary and in-
voluntary actions may lead to implicitly as-
sume a dualistic view of human behaviour. 
By contrast, the cognitive neuroscience of vo-
lition and action recognises voluntary actions 
as equally dependent upon specific brain cir-
cuits. 
In the neuroscience of volition and action, 
the distinction between voluntary and invol-
untary actions is recognised.63 Passingham 
and colleagues define voluntary (internally or 
self-generated) actions as those actions that 
are not driven by an external trigger.64 How-
ever, the distinction is not grounded in dif-
ferent types of explanations about how hu-
man behaviour unfolds.  
According to neuroscientific evidence, 
even the more nuanced and complex volun-
tary actions, and goal-directed agency in gen-
eral, are not independent of the neural cir-
cuits enabling them. By contrast, complex 
voluntary actions represent the highest point 
of a “continuum” starting from very simple 
stimulus-driven motor responses. The execu-
tion of all voluntary movements depends on 
the primary motor cortex (M1), with a major 
contribution of the premotor cortex. Specific 
areas of the brain – including the pre-
supplementary motor area, the anterior pre-
frontal cortex and the parietal cortex – sup-
port many of the characteristics usually asso-
ciated with conscious behaviour, such as 
planning, inhibiting inappropriate actions,65 
or selecting the option to pursue.66 Prefrontal 
regions are involved in action selection and 
maintenance of the goal, and other struc-
tures, such as the basal ganglia and the cere-
bellum, participate in the coordination of 
movement and in cognitive behaviour, in-
cluding planning or reward-based learning.67  
How is this relevant for the law? In order 
to properly exercise its functions, the law 
must resort to some coarse-grained distinc-
tions regarding acceptable and unacceptable 
behaviour, which seems to have little in 
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common with a neuroscientific understand-
ing of the fine-grained differences between 
types of bodily actions. The reason why the 
law targets only intentional harmful behav-
iour and not reflexes is that the former in-
cludes the actions that are susceptible to 
modification by exercising one’s individual 
control and cognitive abilities.  
For practical purposes, the law must 
therefore incorporate a scientifically plausi-
ble understanding of how voluntary behav-
iour unfolds. Our suggestion is that the neu-
roscience of volition and action can and 
should contribute more and more to the 
framing and understanding of justifications 
and excuses to criminal liability. This can be 
done, for example, by improving understand-
ing of the conditions under which people 
lack control over their bodily movements. 
Along a continuum that rejects strong di-
chotomies, individuals can be distinguished 
depending on their capacities, which trans-
late into the ability to understand the law’s 
requirements, act upon them, and learn from 
previous mistakes. The neuroscience of ac-
tion and volition can help to elucidate what 
brain structures and functions enable or un-
dermine those capacities. As a result, psy-
chology and neuroscience are more likely to 
explain the mechanisms that make our re-
sponsible actions possible rather than to rev-
olutionise our concept of responsibility. 
To give a more concrete suggestion, a 
specific area where the contribution of the 
neuroscience of action and volition can be 
relevant concerns the subjective experience, 
i.e., the sense of agency, tied to the perfor-
mance of voluntary actions. Conscious expe-
riences such as choosing, deciding, or initiat-
ing a movement are in fact accompanied by a 
specific phenomenology that is absent in re-
flex actions and less intense in the habitual 
ones. The sense of agency naturally accom-
panies people’s voluntary actions and is rec-
ognised as a key feature of human mental 
life.68 It can be defined as people’s subjective 
feeling to control their actions and, through 
them, their consequences in the external 
world. The sense of agency and the sense of 
responsibility for one’s own actions are seem-
ingly tightly integrated. It has been shown 
that factors that contribute to reducing the 
sense of agency are also involved in reducing 
the sense of responsibility for action.69 
But is the extent to which people feel they 
are in control of their actions, considering 
also standard inter-individual variations, rel-
evant for the law? Overall, this seems to be 
the case. Only an agent who is able to per-
ceive herself as the cause of her own actions, 
tracking the linkage between a voluntary 
bodily movement and its effect, could be sus-
ceptible to the law’s requirements, e.g. could 
learn the contingency between actions and 
outcomes in order to repeat or not to repeat 
similar behaviours in the future. This experi-
ence of authorship extends from the pre-
reflective sense of agency to the feeling of re-
gret for the negative outcomes of the actions 
people felt in control of.70 In the absence of 
this constellation of feelings, people would 
perceive legal requirements as hardly ac-
ceptable constrictions. Correspondingly, it 
might be unfair to hold them liable to pun-
ishment.  
However, it is unclear whether the law 
must take into account people’s feelings and 
subjective reports over their own agency in 
order to draw evaluative conclusions about 
the extent to which they are liable to pun-
ishment. On the one hand, the law is mainly 
concerned with practical outcomes: criminal 
law treats murder differently from attempted 
murder even where, in the two cases, the 
agent’s mental states and bodily movements 
do not differ. On the other hand, psychologi-
cal categories are central to criminal law. Just 
consider how the evaluation of the different 
degrees of “mens rea” relies entirely on con-
siderations concerning the nature of people’s 
mental states.  
The difficulty in dealing with this issue 
emerges clearly in the discussion about the 
limits and the applicability of the “loss of 
control defence”, whose interpretation re-
mains controversial to date.71 One clear ele-
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ment of difficulty is that it is problematic to 
suggest that a diminished subjective sense of 
control should modulate individual account-
ability. To the extent that people are none-
theless able to prevent themselves from act-
ing against the law, they seemingly have a du-
ty to act in accordance to the law. What is the 
threshold (i.e., what counts as a relevant trig-
ger?) for the defence to apply? How much do 
we actually know about the conscious experi-
ence of acting? And to what extent should we 
consider people’s subjective reports a reliable 
source of information about their sense of 
agency? For example, should the law take in-
to account the subjective report of someone 
suggesting that she committed a crime while 
feeling she lost control over her own actions?  
Even assuming that the defendant aims to 
faithfully report her own inner feelings, it has 
been suggested that people’s ability to intro-
spect upon their mental states is highly falla-
cious.72 Opacity of introspection seems to be 
one of the obstacles that prevent the law 
from fully incorporating something like a 
sense of agency requirement for criminal lia-
bility. Furthermore, our sense of agency and 
control has proven to be subjected to manip-
ulation. Experimental evidence has shown 
that people are less able to monitor their mo-
tor performance than the phenomenology of 
agency suggests.73  
For example, while undergoing laboratory 
based brain stimulation, people may report 
having experiences of moving where no real 
movement occurred (stimulating the right 
and left inferior parietal regions), or carry 
out actions without perceiving any sense of 
agency (stimulating the premotor-region).74 
By using unconscious priming as a form of 
external guidance, experimenters are able to 
consistently modulate people’s sense of agen-
cy in ways that are then reflected in explicit 
reports of sense of control, e.g. by triggering 
overestimation of one’s own self-efficacy.75 
More generally, within the perspective of 
modern neuroscience, the sense of control-
ling one’s own actions has been frequently 
considered the result of forms of “a posterio-
ri” (i.e., following outcome presentation), 
self-deceptive confabulation.76 Along these 
lines, Libet’s experiments on the timing of 
conscious intentions played a major role in 
diminishing confidence in the belief that 
conscious experience is involved in “initiat-
ing” people’s voluntary actions.77  
However, once biases, errors and limita-
tions in self-attributions are acknowledged, 
the neurobiological mechanisms regulating 
the subjective experience of voluntarily doing 
something are still in search of a complete 
explanation. Findings on the neural corre-
lates of the sense of agency suggest that it 
may represent a default mode of the human 
brain – differently from the sense of non-
agency (or the feeling of reduced control) 
that produces a specific activation in the an-
gular gyrus.78 To explain and quantify the 
phenomenon, going beyond explicit subjec-
tive reports, Haggard and colleagues have in-
troduced the so-called “intentional binding 
effect”, which is interpreted as an implicit 
marker of the sense of agency.79 
The intentional binding effect reflects a 
subjective temporal association between vol-
untary actions and corresponding outcomes: 
when participants perform a voluntary ac-
tion, they tend to subjectively perceive the 
time between the action and the effect as 
shorter (i.e., temporal attraction, in mental 
time, of the action towards the effect and of 
the effect towards the action) than it was in 
reality. Crucially, the effect is present only 
when the subject is engaging in voluntary ac-
tions, being absent in cases of involuntary 
movements. Therefore, it is interpreted as an 
implicit marker of the sense of agency.  
Experimental evidence seemingly shows 
that the intentional binding effect might be 
elicited by a combination of predictive (i.e., 
prediction of the consequences of the action) 
and retrospective (i.e., outcome evaluation) 
inferential processes.80 In terms of its sources, 
the intentional binding effect might be pro-
duced by the same circuits that enable the 
performance (in the frontal lobe) and moni-
toring (in the parietal cortex) of voluntary 
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action.81 An important plausible consequence 
would be that the same circuits underlying the 
preparation and initiation of voluntary actions 
also produce a prediction of the expected out-
comes: our sense of agency, which is presum-
ably linked to responsibility, might be not just 
a retrospective confabulation, but a «measur-
able signal within the motor system».82 
More specific findings concerning the in-
tentional binding effect are possibly relevant 
for how to understand the sense of agency in 
relation to the law. In particular, it has been 
suggested that positive and morally relevant 
outcomes are associated with a stronger 
sense of agency, with respect to negative and 
non-morally relevant outcomes.83 Interest-
ingly, the sense of agency, as measured by the 
intentional binding effect, is attenuated in 
situations where, in presence of fearful or an-
gry states, participants tend to experience 
themselves as less in control of the action 
they performed.84  
These results could potentially help bridg-
ing the gap between the subjective “experience 
of losing control” and the “loss of control” de-
fence, by providing additional tools to under-
stand the mechanisms underlying action con-
trol. Consider, for example, the point that fol-
lows. Morse suggests that the law has a re-
quirement for minimal rationality, which 
most adults are able to fulfil.85 If the agent re-
alises that, in given circumstances, she is una-
ble to control herself (i.e., she is victim of a 
persistent craving or desire which she finds 
hard to resist) in a way that would potentially 
lead to law violation, it is her duty to take 
some appropriate countermeasure in order to 
prevent herself from actually violating the law 
(e.g., by taking appropriate medicaments). As-
suming the agent has this opportunity, lack of 
control at the time of the wrongful act does 
not necessarily count as an excuse.  
The loss of control defence seemingly 
challenges this conclusion since the wrong-
doer does not necessarily have evidence that 
the fear or anger trigger will lead her to vio-
late the law  (e.g., by killing the victim). A 
better understanding of the conditions that 
may lead the agent to lose control and of 
their relations with the mechanisms enabling 
voluntary behaviour would have therefore 
the potential to refine the discussion about 
the loss of control defence. 
 
█ Conclusions 
 
Neuroscience can contribute to further 
understanding of the cognitive capacities 
that an agent must display to be a fair target 
of normative evaluations and practices, in-
cluding punishment. In this paper, we sug-
gested that the neuroscience of volition and 
action is specifically relevant to the identifi-
cation of the enabling conditions (and corre-
sponding impairments) upon which volun-
tary behaviour depends. In particular, by dis-
cussing the loss of control defence as a case 
study, we suggested that the empirical inves-
tigation of the subjective feelings linked to 
the experience of being an agent could be po-
tentially informative for the law. Thus, we 
advocate more cross-disciplinary work, aimed 
to bridge the gap between conceptual bounda-
ries, on the theme of responsibility for actions. 
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